Scientific consensus should be the *primary* basis for policy on empirical questions — not 'binding.' 'Binding' overstates the epistemological case: consensus is not infallible, can be manufactured by interested parties, can lag emerging evidence, and even where sound, it settles empirical questions while leaving normative policy choices — about distribution of costs, intergenerational equity, acceptable…

Scientific consensus informs empirical facts, but policy also includes values, costs, rights, and trade-offs. Making consensus 'binding' removes democratic discretion over normative choices. Governments should strongly weight consensus on factual matters, but 'binding' is too strong and risks technocracy.

Scientific consensus should strongly guide policy on empirical questions, but it should not be treated as infallible command. Policy still involves values, costs, and tradeoffs — rejects 'binding.'

On matters of empirical reality, such as climate change or epidemiology, the collective weight of the scientific community provides the most reliable foundation for state action. Relying on consensus rather than political intuition ensures that policy is grounded in the best available evidence, which is essential for solving complex technical challenges. While science is iterative,…

Scientific consensus should carry great weight on empirical questions, but policy also involves values, tradeoffs, rights, costs, uncertainty, and democratic legitimacy. Science can tell us what is likely true and what consequences may follow; it cannot by itself decide what risks or sacrifices society should accept. Consensus should inform policy, not bind it completely.